The Threat of U.S.-Style Marketing Power
For someone like me in my 40s, caught up in the whirlwind of dramatic corporate mergers and acquisitions, these experiences became invaluable to my social and professional life thereafter.
At the U.S. corporate headquarters where I used to work, the university-industry collaboration programs, involving engineers and researchers shuttling between academic labs and companies, were housed in a section called “Science & Technologies” within the headquarters’ R&D department. These programs were funded through government grants to conduct research and development. A similar framework exists in Japan, albeit with different funding scales. However, once the marketing department acknowledges the market value of a project, it transitions to a division called “Research & Development/Engineering,” which focuses on the practicalities of industrialization. When the alpha model is completed, plans for manufacturing the beta version begin. By the time it nears completion, several beta units are sold to users on a paid basis. These buyers, fully aware of the situation, provide extensive feedback on issues, which is then returned to the company. When the final specification unit is ready, the beta units are replaced with the final product. This ensures the creation of a “usable product.”
In this process and scenario, marketing plays a significant role, and the structure differs vastly from that of Japanese companies. Additionally, application data accumulates during this time and becomes a critical element for expanding sales. This approach contrasts sharply with domestic university-industry collaboration projects, which take five years to develop a product before it is ready for sale. This gap means that Japanese products in the manufacturing sector, a national strength, are falling significantly behind.
Recently successful IT devices and software tend to incorporate substantial user feedback during the development phase. Meanwhile, leading domestic companies like Keyence prioritize market needs and have achieved immense success as fabless companies. However, very few domestic companies give priority to such management scenarios and directly reflect them in their management and organizational strategies. I often find myself pondering why such significant differences exist between U.S. and Japanese companies and how Japanese companies can survive in the future.
While the systems vary significantly across industries like automobiles, semiconductors, home appliances, and software, the reality is that many Japanese companies in non-automotive manufacturing sectors are struggling to find a path forward. Fortunately, the automotive industry has strong overseas market share, likely because global marketing strategies are integral to their management. Later, I would serve as a consultant for Yamaha Motor’s new business division on its microalgae cultivation plan for astaxanthin. Through this, I learned that Yamaha had prioritized overseas markets in design, testing, and pre-sales since its founding, while outsourcing to specialists. These practices contributed to its increased overseas market share. It is clear that companies excelling in global marketing have been the driving force behind the development of the automotive industry. In contrast, the medical device industry has seen a steady rise in import rates, leading to a low market share for domestic products.
This situation stems from regulatory constraints and the challenges of balancing development costs, which have left companies unable to compete effectively. It seems evident that this predicament arises from the lack of robust marketing concepts at both corporate and national levels.
Global vs. International
One undeniable truth about recent market trends and daily life is the rapid societal transformation driven by the exponential growth in computational speed attributed to the IT revolution. This has triggered an information revolution, dramatically reshaping our social environment.
Professional education plays a significant role in nurturing young individuals with the ability to think freely and develop management strategies. It depends greatly on whether such an educational system is accessible and whether young people have opportunities to engage with it. Education is not about being taught; it is about encountering an environment where one can learn independently and experience firsthand, thereby fostering creativity for the future. This environment should be established within companies, and bold changes in personnel and organizational structures are necessary, even in major corporations.
I do not see today’s young adults in their 20s as a lost cause. I also believe that teenagers hold immense potential. When asking those around me about the difference between “global” and “international,” very few can provide precise answers. “Global” originates from “globe,” representing a borderless world on a planetary scale. Starbucks and iPhones are examples of this, offering localized languages but maintaining identical systems globally. In contrast, “international” refers to a world with borders, valuing the characteristics and cultures of each nation.
A phrase often heard from Japanese business leaders is, “Our company is becoming global, so all employees should learn English.” Hearing this, I can’t help but think, “Does this company even understand the global perspective?” In today’s fast-paced world, it is crucial for companies to rejuvenate and embrace transformation with courage. Creating an environment where young employees, fresh into the workforce, can “learn through experience” is perhaps the most critical step for ensuring the company’s future success.
Asking people around me, “What is marketing?” often results in a variety of answers. Most describe it with terms like “promotion,” “sales activities,” or “advertising.” Rarely have I encountered individuals within Japanese companies who articulate marketing as a critical position tied closely to corporate strategy. True marketing should be situated near the core of management strategy in a company. It should be the department viewing the company from a bird’s-eye perspective.
This team should provide clear reports to executives, supported by evidence and data, answering questions such as: “Are we heading in the right direction?” “Which users should we target with focused sales efforts?” “What are competitors’ strategies?” and “Is the product launch too early or too late?” The positioning of the company in the market must be evaluated with precision and reported clearly.
The phrase “Development creates, manufacturing builds, and sales sells” is commonly heard in Japanese companies. But is that really enough? In today’s world, businesses must think globally. From the outset, product development plans should consider overseas markets, treating the global market as their playground. In the bioscience research support market, many Japanese researchers have studied abroad and are on par with, if not superior to, their international counterparts. Instead of saying, “We can’t compete with U.S. products in bioscience equipment,” Japanese companies should aim to strengthen domestic product marketing while leveraging U.S. field marketing expertise to plan initial test sales in the U.S. I earnestly hope such forward-thinking Japanese companies will emerge soon.
Product Marketing and Field Marketing
From my experience working in U.S. companies, I learned that two essential components of marketing always coexist: product marketing and field marketing. Product marketing involves assigning responsibility for products to the R&D/Engineering division. On the other hand, field marketing focuses on gathering accurate market information, including product launch timing, pricing strategies, application prioritization, and market branding frameworks. It plays a critical role in researching, analyzing, and collaborating with the sales department to create effective plans. These two categories work together to form a structured system that fosters teamwork within the organization.
U.S. companies excel at structuring teamwork. Japanese organizations, in contrast, often seem constrained by rigid organizational frameworks and an overly individualistic “salaryman” mindset. While many Japanese companies have adopted free-desking in recent years, traditionally, managers sit by the windows, with desks arranged so subordinates are always visible. In the U.S., partitioned cubicles are standard, which initially made me wonder how communication was maintained in such segmented spaces. American offices are remarkably quiet, whereas Japanese offices often buzz with phone calls and chatter. However, in the silent U.S. offices, employees effectively perform as team members. This efficiency stems from the clarity of individual roles and responsibilities, along with an ingrained free-agent mentality cultivated from childhood through experiential learning. I once read about “work obesity,” a term describing individuals who cannot complete tasks, failing to grasp the essence of their work or team-based role allocation, and instead, endlessly and aimlessly working.
Back then, I often saw sales staff returning to the office and working late every night. One sales manager, Mr. Y, introduced a “no unpaid overtime” policy in his evaluation criteria for the following year, but the affected employee’s inability to manage his workload remained unchanged, resulting in the lowest evaluation in the company. Such issues, I believe, would not arise in a company with a true marketing function and a proper educational system. What do you see when you look around your own workplace?
After establishing Japan Perceptive Corporation as a U.S. subsidiary in 1996, we launched our first MALDI-TOF mass spectrometer. The domestic team demonstrated its strengths in sales and field marketing, but the technical service team played an equally pivotal role. They constantly reported product issues and areas for improvement to the development and manufacturing teams via phone. As a result, every subsequent shipment was improved, leading to products that truly embodied “user-friendly” specifications. This success was, without a doubt, due to the U.S. product marketing team accurately incorporating field marketing feedback, thereby enhancing business efficiency. I am confident that this unconscious yet effective execution of genuine global marketing was the key to this success.
Unprecedented Growth in the Biotech Fever and the Final Year of the 20th Century
In 1995, Japan Perceptive Corporation was established as a spin-off, only to be absorbed back into its parent company through an M&A after a short four years. During that time, the company achieved annual sales exceeding ¥10 billion, with nearly 40% of revenue coming from the Japanese market. By 1998, the newly formed Applied Biosystems Japan (ABI) restarted operations with 180 employees and domestic sales reaching ¥20 billion. By 2001, at the declaration of the completion of the Human Genome Project, the company had grown to 290 employees and ¥30 billion in sales.
I still believe such unprecedented growth in a venture company will be rarely seen again. With past experiences in mind—such as the inevitability that “acquired employees, including top executives, are eventually let go”—I discussed with Richard about establishing a marketing department that could anticipate the near future. We formed a new field marketing team composed of five members from the acquired side and three from the acquiring side, naming it the “Bio-Discovery Division.”
Around the same time, ABI’s U.S. headquarters launched a venture project aiming to outpace national projects in sequencing the human genome. This involved aligning approximately 300 DNA sequencers to decode the genome. This initiative became Celera Genomics, which gained significant media attention in 2001 when the completion of the Human Genome Project was announced.
Celera Genomics was listed on NASDAQ, and the headquarters rebranded as PE Biosystems. However, in Japan, it was decided that Celera Genomics’ business would remain undeveloped, and ABI retained its name. The newly established Bio-Discovery Division was tasked with handling Celera Genomics’ business. One of the division’s achievements was managing the genetic analysis code subscription business, which was first introduced to Takeda Pharmaceutical Company. Another notable event was the attention garnered from investors during the biotech fever. Notably, I had the chance to meet Masayoshi Son of SoftBank, though it remains unclear if they were planning a major investment. As the company’s stock surged like a trading game, overseas investments, particularly from Japan, were ignored, leading to the eventual dissolution of the initiative.
At the time, I considered this the peak of the business. Richard, the Japanese branch president, shared the same sentiment. Richard was set to transfer to Celera Genomics, and drastic personnel reshuffling across global offices followed.
One day, Richard invited me out for a beer in Ginza. At the beer hall, he revealed his plans:
“Iwase-san, I’ll be returning to the U.S. by year-end. Your new representative will be coming from Hong Kong, but he’s a political type. Your salary might only be secured for the next six months.”
I replied, “I see. Well, out of 100 acquired company presidents, 99 are gone within a year.” Behind this casual conversation was a realization that “this day would eventually come,” and I resolved to resign within a month. Perhaps a lingering sense of pride influenced my decision at the time.
Richard’s conversation happened just after the May 2001 holidays. Soon after, I received an offer from ICG, an investment firm I had connected with during previous marketing activities. They were setting up an incubation team for biotech-related businesses and invited me to join. Along with my subordinate S, who had worked with me for 15 years, and my secretary, I decided to leave ABI to join ICG. On June 30, 2001, I officially left ABI. On my final day, former Japan Perceptive Corporation colleagues organized a farewell party at a Roppongi restaurant, presenting me with a large bouquet of flowers. However, none of us could have predicted the unexpected turn of events that would force me to set aside my pride just a week after my resignation.
During the announcement of the completion of the Human Genome Project at the White House, Dr. Craig Venter (Celera Genomics) and Dr. Francis Collins (NIH) were featured on the cover of TIME magazine.
Today, we live amidst a period of unprecedented global transformation. Did anyone during the Meiji Restoration foresee how the world would change? Could anyone after World War II have predicted Japan’s current state? We must entrust the younger generation with the future of Japan, especially during this pivotal era of change and opportunity. To envision the future, we must first understand the archives of the past, derive stories from those facts, and only then can a vision for the future emerge. Building genuine strategies requires cultivating such scenarios within oneself. I wholeheartedly hope that Japanese companies will empower their younger employees during this transformative period to become agents of change.

Mr. Hisashi Iwase
Life Science Innovation Advisor at the Japan Analytical Instruments Manufacturers’ Association (JAIMA),
and President & CEO of BioDiscovery Inc. Born in 1951, Tokyo.
Graduated from the Department of Industrial Chemistry, College of Science and Technology, Nihon University.
Mr. Iwase’s extensive career in managing and marketing analytical and bioscience instruments includes
positions at Merck Japan, Waters Japan, Millipore Japan, PerSeptive Biosystems Japan, Applied Biosystems,
Varian Technologies, and Agilent Technologies. In 2001, he established BioDiscovery Inc., and since 2013,
he has served as a Life Science Innovation Advisor for JAIMA.